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Luftgangster1 over Germany: The Lynching of 
American Airmen in the Shadow  
of the Air War 
Kevin T. Hall ∗ 
Abstract: »,Luftgangster‘ über Deutschland: Lynchjustiz gegen amerikanische 
Flieger im Schatten des Luftkrieges«. This study analyzes the Lynchjustiz com-
mitted against American airmen in Germany during World War II. Largely over-
looked by historians, the extent of violence against flyers is drastically underes-
timated, hindered by the complex historical memory of the Allied air war, the 
arduous denazification process, and the looming Cold War of the postwar era. 
While the precise number of Allied flyers that experienced Lynchjustiz is impos-
sible to determine, due to a lack of remaining records, this study provides a 
more accurate estimate and an improved historical analysis of the broader im-
pact of these events on history. Lynchjustiz initially occurred as a spontaneous 
response to the devastating experiences of the Allied air war in 1943. The Nazi 
regime took advantage of German citizens’ plight to endure the overwhelming 
and inexorable air war that erased all physically and psychologically boundaries 
and attempted to harness the outrage of the German population, redirecting 
the anger explicitly against the new enemy in their midst. Individuals and 
groups of civilians, Party officials, security forces, government officials, as well 
as military members carried out this state-sponsored vigilantism, which was a 
byproduct of the political and societal instability produced by the Nazi regime. 
Keywords: Lynching, Lynchjustiz, downed airmen, prisoners of war, World War 
II, war crimes, flyer trials. 
1.  Introduction  
Returning from a bombing mission over northern Germany on August 13, 
1944, an American bomber crew bailed out over enemy territory after flak 
disabled their aircraft. Likely their first jump out of an airplane, the flyers were 
full of adrenaline and anxiety about the fate that awaited them. One airman 
                                                             
1  The term Luftgangster means “gangsters of the air” and was often used in Nazi propaganda 
to refer to Allied airmen. This article is based on the following doctoral thesis: Hall, Kevin T. 
2018. 'Terror Flyers' and the German Public: The Lynching of American Airmen in Nazi 
Germany. Dissertation, Central Michigan University. 
∗  Kevin T. Hall, Central Michigan University, 106 Powers Hall, 1201 S. Washington St., Mount 
Pleasant, Michigan 48859, USA; hall1kt@cmich.edu. 
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landed safely in a field next to a highway near Lübeck-Siems, Germany, four-
teen miles from the Baltic Sea, and German soldiers immediately captured 
him.2 In addition to landing safely, being in the custody of soldiers must have 
offered an initial sense of relief for the flyer, since rumors among airmen de-
scribed German security forces, Party officials, and especially civilians as 
likely to be more hostile to downed airmen than soldiers. Downed flyers who 
evaded capture and returned to England with the aid of resistance fighters, as 
well as prisoners of war (POWs) who had returned through medical exchanges, 
all bolstered these rumors with personal accounts of seeing Allied flyers 
hanged from lampposts in bombed-out cities or from beams at train stations.3  
Yet as the soldiers escorted the flyer along the highway towards the city of 
Lübeck, his sense of relief quickly turned to fear. An angry mob incensed by 
the aerial attacks (made up mainly of civilians, two SS soldiers, and the local 
block leader) encircled him. The block leader, a low-level Nazi Party official 
responsible for neighborhood supervision, told the two soldiers guarding the 
flyer to “leave him to us so that we can have some sport with him.”4 After SS 
and Party officials questioned the airman about his nationality, the mob (in-
cluding women) beat him mercilessly with farm tools, steel helmets, and any-
thing they had at hand. The terrified flyer bled profusely as they ruthlessly 
directed blows at his head. The injuries quickly took their toll on the airman, 
who collapsed from the pain and shock, but the crowd did not stop after they 
rendered him unconscious. They beat him until his face was unrecognizable 
then dragged his lifeless body back into the cornfield, where the block leader 
shot him eight times in the back and the head. The perpetrators then threw his 
body in the trunk of a nearby vehicle and buried his remains in an unmarked 
grave. 
A United States postwar crime tribunal tried twelve of the perpetrators in 
March and April of 1947 in Dachau for willfully, deliberately, and wrongfully 
encouraging and abetting in the killing of the unknown American flyer. While 
two civilians were acquitted, five perpetrators – including one woman and an 
                                                             
2  The fate of the remaining bomber crewmembers remains unknown. The names of airmen are 
given when known. Only one-third of known American airmen who experienced 
mistreatment were identified. 
3  Review and Recommendations for Case No. 12-2370; Deputy Theater Judge Advocate’s 
Office, War Crimes Branch, January 16, 1946; Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate 
General (Army), RG 153; Entry 143; Box 419, National Archives at College Park, College Park, 
MD; Review and Recommendations for Case No. 12-1994; Deputy Theater Judge Advocate’s 
Office, War Crimes Branch, January 16, 1946; Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate 
General (Army), RG 153; Entry 143; Box 403, National Archives at College Park, College Park, 
MD; “Citizens Menaced Hamburg Bombers,” The New York Times, October 22, 1943; 
“Germany Admits Fliers’ Lynchings,” The New York Times, June 1, 1944. 
4  Review and Recommendations for Case No. 12-1307; Deputy Theater Judge Advocate’s Office, 
War Crimes Branch, January 16, 1946; Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General 
(Army), RG 153; Entry 143; Box 350, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
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SS soldier – received sentences ranging from one to ten years; however, the 
West German government released them all by 1952. The block leader who 
executed the flyer received a death sentence, while two civilians and an SS 
soldier received life imprisonment; yet each of these men had also received 
parole by the spring of 1954.5 
Stories such as this, though vicious and largely forgotten in popular 
memory, were not uncommon. From 1943 to 1945, instances of mob mentality 
gripped German citizens, who sought revenge for personal and material losses, 
throughout Nazi Germany and its occupied territories. Identified as “lynch 
justice” (Lynchjustiz) by the Nazi regime, instances are documented in nearly 
every country in Europe, ranging from Italy to Denmark, from France to Po-
land, throughout the Baltic Region, and everywhere in between.6 Moreover, 
Germans were not the sole perpetrators of such violence against downed air-
men. Although they represented the largest group of criminals, perpetrators of 
various European nationalities existed and acted either in accordance with the 
Nazi regime or sought personal revenge, e.g., for the destruction caused by the 
Allied air war. 
While a few historians have focused mainly on a limited number cases in-
volving the violence against American airmen during World War II, the topic 
remains largely overlooked and the actual extent of the mistreatment of Allied 
flyers is greatly underestimated (Sigel 1992; Brode 1997; Stiepani 1999; 
Greene 2003; Vourkoutiotis 2003; Hilton 2004; Friedrich 2006; Riedel 2006; 
Weingartner 2008). The most infamous incident was the Rüsselsheim massa-
cre, which occurred on August 26, 1944 (Neliba 2000; Freeman 2011). Follow-
ing a devastating bombing raid by the British Royal Air Force (RAF), German 
civilians and political officials ruthlessly beat eight American airmen who were 
being transferred to the interrogation camp (Dulag Luft) located in Oberursel, 
which was less than thirty miles away from Rüsselsheim. Six of the flyers died 
and two managed to escape and survived the war.7  
Encompassing all levels of society, the violence against downed Allied air-
men reiterates the extensive brutality and immorality that occurred during the 
war. While historians have revealed that German citizens played a key role as 
                                                             
5  Ibid. 
6  Throughout this study, the term Lynchjustiz will refer to the mistreatment (both assaults 
and killings) experienced by downed airmen in World War II. 
7  Sergeant Elmore L. Austin (Edinburg Falls, Vermont), Sergeant William A. Dumont (Berlin, 
New Hampshire), Second Lieutenant Norman J. Rogers, Jr. (Rochester, New York), Second 
Lieutenant John N. Sekul (Bronx, New York), Flight Officer Haigus Tufenkjian (Detroit, 
Michigan), Staff Sergeant Thomas D. Williams, Jr. (Hazelton, Pennsylvania), Sergeant William 
A. Adams (Klingerstown, Pennsylvania), and Sergeant Sidney Eugene Brown (Gainesville, 
Florida). Adams and Brown managed to survive the brutal beatings. They escaped from the 
cemetery, where they were left on a cart to die. They evaded for four days until Nazi 
officials captured them. The two men spent the remainder of the war in a POW camp, 
Stalag Luft IV in Tychowo, Poland. 
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(Evans 2009, 465; Overy 2013, 310; Hoffmann 2015, 233, 383). Yet, what did 
Lynchjustiz actually entail? Were airmen exclusively killed or did the violence 
include assaults as well? Who were the perpetrators? Why did they carry out 
this form of vigilante justice? How often did Lynchjustiz occur? What new 
information can be ascertained about the social milieu of Nazi Germany by 
analyzing Lynchjustiz committed against airmen? These are a few guiding 
questions around which this article will focus. 
Building upon the limited research on Lynchjustiz committed against 
downed Allied airmen, Austrian historian Georg Hoffmann is the most recent 
scholar to study this phenomenon. Hoffmann concluded that there were rough-
ly 1,000 cases (including both murders and assaults) of Lynchjustiz against 
American airmen throughout Europe (Hoffmann 2015, 383). In fact, he deter-
mined that more cases of mistreatment occurred in Austria and Hungary than in 
any other country – roughly 600, of which 130 resulted in death (Hoffmann 
2015, 383). However, like previous historians, Hoffmann assumed that the 
historiographical standard of 350 cases of Lynchjustiz is accurate. Nevertheless, 
his study is a valued attempt at investigating these relatively unknown incidents.  
Hoffmann is the first to not only include in his study the mistreated victims 
who survived, but also to analyze the perpetrators who carried out these acts of 
violence. Perpetrators’ backgrounds and societal positions are key to under-
standing not only the phenomenon’s origins but also how it persisted. Scholars 
have failed, however, to determine the extent of violence in Germany or ad-
dress the symbolic meaning of lynching. While the precise number of Allied 
flyers that experienced Lynchjustiz is impossible to determine, due to a lack of 
documentation, the need for a more accurate estimate as well as a better histor-
ical analysis of the broader impact of these events on history is apparent. 
The initial attempt to document Lynchjustiz cases already began at the end 
of 1944, as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expedition Force (SHAEF), 
commanded by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, instructed Army group com-
manders to create a detailed list of alleged war crimes committed against 
American nationals. Commanders were not tasked, however, with actually 
investigating or gathering any additional evidence. Investigations began imme-
diately following the war and became part of the so-called Dachau trials. 
Largely overshadowed by the infamous trials at Nuremberg, which targeted 
high-ranking Nazi officials’ crimes against humanity, lower-ranking war crim-
inals were prosecuted at the Dachau trials from 1945 to 1947.9 These tribunals 
held over 400 trials that prosecuted over 1,500 “lesser” war criminals, with 
                                                             
9  For more information on the process and procedures of investigating war crimes, see: Hall 
2018. 
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American airmen representing the largest group of victims.10 The cases that 
focused specifically on the mistreatment of airmen are known as the flyer trials. 
The remaining trials dealt with crimes against Americans and Europeans at 
various concentration camps (e.g. Mauthausen, Flossenburg, Buchenwald, 
Mühldorf, and Dora-Nordhausen), the Malmedy Massacre (the execution of 
eighty-four POWs during the Battle of the Bulge), and the Skorzeny trial, 
which dealt with German soldiers wearing United States military uniforms 
during a false flag operation. 
Although the flyer trials surely do not describe every instance pertaining to 
the mistreatment of downed airmen, they represent the largest known collection 
of documents pertaining to this topic. Moreover, analyzing these trials offers an 
attempt to characterize the type of perpetrators most likely to have been in-
volved in Lynchjustiz, their reasoning for committing violence, and provide the 
potential to uncover previously unknown war crimes. In fact, the remains of 
airmen from World War II are still being uncovered today in Germany and 
throughout the world.11 Thus, analyzing these trials provides a valuable oppor-
tunity to establish a basis for understanding the process and extent of these 
atrocities, as well as offers a comparison for future studies to build on.  
The lynching of Allied airmen reveals an aspect of the war that historians 
have overlooked, namely, the explicit involvement and culpability of the Ger-
man home front – whether security forces or soldiers, Party officials or civil-
ians, men or women – in committing violence against POWs. Given certain 
situational circumstances, – e.g., an environment of total war where violence 
was sanctioned by the regime and a society that perceived the war as an ulti-
mate fight for survival – the German public (in varying degrees) tolerated and 
participated in the killing of downed Allied airmen. As historian Hew Strachan 
reasoned, perpetrators may need to be instructed by the state “to get over their 
initial revulsion, and they may still need the state’s authority to rationalize their 
actions to themselves, but in the immediacy of killing other more basic impulses 
– including sadism – can come into play” (Strachan 2005, 47). Given the inten-
sity and totality of the war, especially in the final year, violence, such as 
Lynchjustiz, “could result as easily from a sense of panic and crisis as from any 
                                                             
10  The term “lesser” war crime trials, in accordance to the Moscow Declaration, distinguished 
the accused perpetrators from the high-profile war criminals at the Nuremberg trials. In no 
way does it refer to the severity of their accused crimes committed. 
11  For example, see: “Remains of Pilot Shot Down during WWII to be Buried in N.Y.” CBS News. 
November 28, 2017. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/robert-mains-pilot-shot-down-wwii-
remains-n-y-burial/>; “Cleveland WWII Airman Receives Funeral in Willoughby.” The News-
Herald. June 2, 2015. <http://www.news-herald.com/article/hr/20150502/NEWS/15050989 
6>; “Remains of Fallen WWII Airman Returned to Family for Burial.” Stars and Stripes. 
August 23, 2012. <https://www.stripes.com/news/ europe/germany/remains-of-fallen-wwii-
airman-returned-to-family-for-burial-1.186673>; “WWII Army Aircrew Laid to Rest.” Army 
News. October 26, 2011. <https://www.army.mil/article/68064/wwii_army_aircrew_laid_ 
to_rest>. 
HSR 43 (2018) 2  │  283 
sense of collective cohesion,” as historian Nicholas Stargardt clarified (Star-
gardt 2017, 411). 
Germany’s devastating loss at Stalingrad in February of 1942, its defeat in 
North Africa in May of 1943, and the Allied invasion of Italy and France were 
turning points in the war – both strategically and psychologically – and facili-
tated the Allied advance across Europe. Not until the Casablanca Conference in 
1943, however, was Hitler’s uncompromising will to wage war met by the 
Allies’ unequivocal response to seek victory at all costs, as the Combined 
Bomber Offensive targeted Germany’s economic and industrial capability to 
wage war around-the-clock (Förster 2005, 91). Moreover, the failed attempt to 
assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944, changed Hitler’s attitude with regard to 
imposing total war. While Goebbels had promoted mobilizing German society 
for total war since 1942, Hitler and many others had avoided this; they feared 
that this would lead to a collapse of the home front – as had occurred in World 
War I – and that this would result in not only Germany losing the war but the 
inability of the Aryan race to survive. Nazi leadership imbued an even more 
radical sense of purpose following the attempt on Hitler’s life. Goebbels was 
appointed Plenipotentiary for total war measures, which resulted in the in-
creased control over the German population to support the war effort. An in-
creasing amount of responsibility for the defense of Germany fell to the various 
regional Nazi Party leaders (Gauleiter), who were, for example, involved in 
expressing the regime’s desire to lynch downed Allied airmen. Yet, despite the 
regime’s attempt to keep the “people’s community” or “national community” 
(Volksgemeinschaft) under control, it was never capable of exerting total con-
trol, as Jürgen Förster clarified (Förster 2005, 93-4).12 The final step in mobiliz-
ing German society for total war was the establishment of the Volkssturm in 
September of 1944, as it sought to incorporate the remainder of civilians (most-
ly young boys, old men, and women) in the war effort.  
2.  The Escalation of Lynchjustiz  
During World War II, the Nazi regime fully embraced the concept of lynching. 
This resulted in the increased agency of German citizens, albeit under the ob-
servation of the police state. Support for such violence gradually increased 
throughout the war, as the devastation caused by the air war increased, along 
with a number of unfulfilled promises by the Nazi regime, e.g. “revenge weap-
ons” (Vergeltungswaffen). The number of lynchings in Germany increased in 
direct proportion to the increase in Allied sorties flown over Germany, as this 
                                                             
12  For more information on Volksgemeinschaft, see: Broszat 1983; Bergerson 2004; Welch 
2004; Süß and Süß 2008; Bajohr and Weldt 2009; Wildt 2011; Schmiechen-Ackermann 
2012; Keller 2013; Steber and Gotto 2014; Stargardt 2017. 
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brought an amplified number of enemy airmen in contact with the German 
home front [see Charts 113 and 214].  
Chart 1: American Airplanes Lost in the European Theater 
 
Chart 2: Lynchjustiz Committed against Downed Airmen in Germany 
 
While the history of the United States was fairly well-known by the Nazi elite, 
the regime published a series of newspaper columns in the Völkischer Beo-
bachter titled, for example, “What is English about Americanism?” beginning 
in the spring of 1944. These columns informed the public about the hypocriti-
cal history and questionable culture of the United States [see Image 2].15 
                                                             
13  Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, World War II. Office of Statistical Control–December 
1945. Battle Casualties in European Theater by Casualty Type, Table 159. 
14  Deputy Theater Judge Advocate’s Office, War Crimes Branch, January 16, 1946. Records of 
the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Army), RG 153, Entry 143, Box 155-510, National 
Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
15  Fürholzer, Edmund. “Was ist englisch am Amerikanismus?,” Völkischer Beobachter (Berlin), 
April 14-16, 1944; See also: Böttiger 1944. 
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Image 2: “Triumphal Procession of the U.S. Civilization” 
 
Soure: Kladderadatsch, November 1, 1942, <http://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/kla1942/0696> 
(Accessed May 9, 2018). 
 
In addition, propaganda images [see Image 3, 4, and 5] aggressively portrayed 
Allied airmen not only as the key symbol of American savagery and immorali-
ty but also as the bearers of responsibility for the destructive and devastating 
air war over Germany. By summer of 1944, ex-post facto propaganda depicted 
the appropriateness of Lynchjustiz against downed airmen because the Allied 
air war bombed urban areas, which resulted in civilian casualties. This form of 
violence was often portrayed as “American justice,” as lynchings were used to 
punish alleged criminals throughout the United States. Therefore, it was viewed 
as a fitting means to seek retribution.16 Moreover, the institutionalized racism 
against African-Americans and the allegedly immoral culture in the United 
States was often a symbolic topic expressed in propaganda images. Propaganda 
attempted to draw attention to the hypocrisy of the American government for 
relying on African-Americans – often depicted as American flyers in propa-
ganda images – to fight in the name of democracy despite a long history of 
enslavement, subjugation, and racism.17 
                                                             
16  Examples of propaganda magazines included: Kladderadatsch, Lustige Blätter, and Fliegende 
Blätter, and Das Schwarze Korps. 
17  For more information on the portrayal of American flyers and lynching in Nazi propaganda, 
see: Hall 2018. 
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Image 3: At the “Shooting Stand,” Eleanor Roosevelt states, “3 throws for just 1 
dollar, my boys. The best training for young terror flyers!” 
 
Source: Kladderadatsch, November 28, 1943, <http://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/kla 
1943/0625> (Accessed May 9, 2018). 
 
Lynchjustiz blurred the parameters of war, representing an activity waged for 
(and in the name of) the regime out of political and strategic purposes but also 
as an endorsed, individual act of personal revenge by the German public. 
Downed Allied airmen offered the German home front – specifically civilians – 
an opportunity to actively confront the enemy, who they viewed was responsi-
ble for the air war. As the Allied bombing raids increasingly disrupted the way 
of life for the German home front, it made the war more personal for the Ger-
man public and it resulted in the possibility of more extreme reactions, as the 
mobilization of the Volksgemeinschaft increased after the summer of 1944 
(Strachan 2005, 51).18 While Lynchjustiz was a logical response in the minds of 
many individuals affected by the war, this violence “did not require Nazified 
zealots (though surely such were not lacking), [but] merely conscientious and 
politically obtuse soldiers [and civilians] to carry out the reprisals,” as historian 
Jürgen Förster confirmed (Förster 2005, 106). The bombing of cities inflicted 
great turmoil on all individuals, especially civilians, during the war, and 
                                                             
18  As Hew Strachan declared, “the more personal the combat, the more brutal it seemed to 
become.” 
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wreaked angst, devastation, despair, frustration, and death. Struggle for nation-
al survival along with the desire to prevent the heavy losses and embarrassing 
defeat experienced in World War I provided the emotional foundation for the 
radicalization of war, which led to relaxed ethical limitations on violence.19  
Image 4: “So boys – pay attention. All of the churches and national sanctuaries 
are marked in red on the map.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kladderadatsch, Number 96, August 15, 1943, p. 2, <http://digi.ub.uni-
heidelberg.de/diglit/kla1943/0443> (Accessed May 9, 2018). 
 
                                                             
19  For example, see: Kühne 2017.  
HSR 43 (2018) 2  │  288 
Image 5: “Our enthusiastic student pilot! He was supposed to be lynched for 
killing a white person, but was able to be saved at the last minute.” 
 
Source: Lustige Blätter, Number 43, 1943. 
 
Historians cite two main documents that indicate the Nazi regime condoned 
and urged Lynchjustiz. The first was Joseph Goebbels’ article in the Völkischer 
Beobachter on May 27, 1944, while the second was Martin Bormann’s letter to 
Reich leaders (Reichsleitern), regional leaders (Gauleitern), organization lead-
ers (Verbändeführer), and local district leaders (Kreisleitern) on May 30, 1944. 
As Goebbels wrote:  
It is only possible to protect the lives of downed enemy pilots with the use of 
armed forces, as the afflicted population would otherwise kill them. Who is 
right here? The murderers who, after their cowardly misdeeds, still expect 
humane treatment on the part of the victims or the victims who want to defend 
themselves according to the principle of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a 
tooth. This question is not difficult to answer. In any case, it would be intoler-
able to use German soldiers to protect child murderers from the rage-stricken 
parents who resort to self-defense after having just lost their most precious 
possessions through the brutal cynicism of the enemy.20 
                                                             
20  Joseph Goebbels 1944. See also, “The Terror Flyer Order” 1960, 166-9. The Original German 
text states: “Es ist nur mit Hilfe der bewaffneten Macht möglich, bei solchen Angriffen 
abgeschossene Feindpiloten in ihrem Leben zu sichern, da sie sonst von der heimgesuchten 
Bevölkerung totgeschlagen würden. Wer hat hier recht, die Mörder, die nach ihren feigen 
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Bormann’s letter took Goebbels’ article a step further, acknowledging that the 
German population had already lynched downed airmen repeatedly. Bormann 
wrote that 
In recent weeks, English and North American airmen have repeatedly shot at 
children playing, women and children working in the fields, peasants working 
on farms, wagons on the road, etc. during low-level strafing attacks. This is 
the most awful way to murder defenseless civilians – especially women and 
children. It has often occurred that downed crewmembers of such aircraft 
were immediately arrested and lynched on the spot by the outraged popula-
tion. Police and criminal prosecution of the people involved were omitted.21  
Bormann’s letter was distributed throughout the Nazi Party chain of command 
(e.g. Reichsleiter, Gauleiter, and Kreisleiter); however, he requested that local 
Nazi Party group leaders (Ortsgruppenleiter) be notified verbally. This was 
done in a similar fashion with the “Final Solution.” The effect and interpreta-
tion of this letter can be seen in an order issued by Albert Hoffman – Gauleiter 
and National Defense Commissioner of the Gau Westphalia South – to county 
Nazi Party leaders (Kreisleiter) and Volkssturm officials on February 25, 1945. 
The order reads as follows:  
Any fighter-bomber pilots shot down are on principle not to be protected 
against the indignation of the people. I expect from all police offices that they 
will refuse to lend their protection to these gangster types. Authorities acting 
in contradiction to the popular sentiment will be taken to account by me. All 
police and gendarmerie officials are to be informed immediately by this, my 
attitude.22 
                                                                                                                                
Untaten noch eine humane Behandlung seitens ihrer Opfer erwarten, oder die Opfer, die 
sich nach dem Grundsatz zur Wehr setzen wollen: Auge um Auge, Zahn um Zahn? Diese 
Fragen dürften nicht schwer zu beantworten sein. Jedenfalls wäre es zuviel von uns 
verlangt, wenn man von uns forderte, dass wir deutsche Soldaten zum Schutz fuer 
Kindermörder einsetzen, gegen die die von rasender Wut ergriffenen Eltern, die gerade ihr 
kostbarstes Gut durch den brutalen Zynismus des Feindes verloren haben, zur Selbstwehr 
schreiten.”  
21  Martin Bormann, “Volksjustiz gegen anglo-amerikanische Mörder,“ Letter to Reichsleiter, 
Gauleiter, Verbändeführer, and Kreisleiter. August 30, 1944. NARA, Record Group 549, Case 
12-2000, Vol. 36: Records of United States Army, Europe, 1942-1991. The original German 
text states: “Englische und nordamerikanische Flieger haben in den letzten Wochen 
wiederholt im Tiefflug auf Plätzen spielende Kinder, Frauen und Kinder bei der Feldarbeit, 
pflügende Bauern, Fuhrwerke auf der Landstrasse, Eisenbahnzüge usw. aus geringer Höhe 
mit Bordwaffen beschossen und dabei auf gemeinste Weise wehrlose Zivilisten – 
insbesondere Frauen und Kinder – hingemordet. Mehrfach ist es vorgekommen, dass 
abgesprungene oder notgelandete Besatzungsmitglieder solcher Flugzeuge unmittelbar 
nach der Festnahme durch die auf das Äußerste empörte Bevölkerung an Ort und Stelle 
gelyncht wurden. Von polizeilicher und strafgerichtlicher Verfolgung der dabei beteiligten 
Volksgenossen wurde abgesehen.” 
22  Order from Albert Hoffman, Gauleiter and National Defense Commissioner for the Gau 
Westphalia South, to Nazi Party county leaders (Kreisleiter) and Volkssturm officials. 
February 25, 1945. NARA, Microfilm T-1021, Roll 10. 12-1077, Vol. 9; see also: Trial of The 
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Yet, these were not the only documents that bolstered the expansion of 
Lynchjustiz. Hitler’s Commando Order from October 18, 1942, stated that 
“from now on, all enemy soldiers ... in battle or attempting to escape are to be 
killed (niederzumachen) down to the last man regardless of whether they are 
seamen, airmen, or paratroopers. Secret agents and saboteurs ... are to be given 
over to the SD.”23 This set the precedence for the verbal order to “exterminate 
terror and sabotage troops.”24 By August of 1943, Heinrich Himmler was in-
volved in the development of Lynchjustiz, ordering in a short memo that “It is 
not the job of the police to interfere between the German people (Volksgenos-
sen) and downed English and American terror flyers.”25 In a meeting on May 
16, 1944, Goering even proposed on-the-spot executions of such downed air-
men.26 Accordingly, the five aforementioned documents show the escalation of 
Lynchjustiz, which began as a decentralized form of popular justice by German 
citizens in an attempt to seek revenge for the devastation caused by the air war, 
but by the summer of 1944 it became a state-sponsored form of combatting the 
enemy and seeking revenge. 
Throughout June of 1944, the process of finalizing the classification of a ter-
ror flyer took place at a meeting with representatives from the Reich Foreign 
Affairs Office (Auswärtige Amt), SS, High Command of the Air Force (Ober-
kommando der Luftwaffe), High Command of the Armed Forces (Ober-
kommando der Wehrmacht), and the commandant of the Luftwaffe interroga-
tion center (Dulag Luft) in Oberursel.27 In addition, these government officials 
established the procedure to deal with terror flyers as well as how to implement 
the topic of terror flyers in propaganda (both domestically and internationally). 
After an initial meeting on June 6, 1944, which coincided, though likely unin-
tentionally, with the Allied invasion of Normandy, German officials decided 
                                                                                                                                
Major War Criminals Before The International Military Tribunal: Nuremberg, 14 November 
1945 – 1 October 1946, Volume XX (Nuremberg, 1948), 54. 
23  Adolf Hitler. Commando Order, October 18, 1942. The original German text states: “Von 
jetzt ab sind alle … Gegner … im Kampf oder auf der Flucht bis auf den letzten Mann 
niederzumachen. Es ist dabei ganz gleich, ob sie zu ihren Aktionen durch Schiffe und 
Flugzeuge angelandet werden oder mittels Fallschirmen abspringen ... Agenten, Saboteurs, 
usw. . . . sind sie dem SD zu übergeben.“ NARA, Record Group 549, Case 12-2000, Vol. 36.  
24  Wagner, letter attached to the forwarded Hitler Decree from October 18, 1942. The original 
German text states: “Anliegend wird ein Erlass des Führers über die Vernichtung von Terror- 
und Sabotagetruppe übersandt.“ NARA, Record Group 549, Case 12-2000, Vol. 36.  
25  Heinrich Himmler memo from August 10, 1943. The original German text states: “Es ist nicht 
Aufgabe die Polizei, sich in Auseinandersetzungen zwischen deutschen Volksgenossen und 
abgesprungenen englischen und amerikanischen Terrorfliegern einzumischen.” NARA, 
Record Group 549, Case 12-2000, Vol. 36. 
26  Goering, Hermann. “Jägerbesprechung beim Reichsmarschall.” May 16, 1944. NARA, Record 
Group 549, Case 12-2000, Vol. 36.  
27  For more information on the experiences of Allied airmen held at Dulag Luft in Oberursel, 
see: Hall 2018; Geck 2008. 
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that “Lynchjustiz would have to be considered as the rule.”28 The specifics were 
set by June 14, 1944, with the Foreign Affairs Office agreeing to them by June 
20, 1944, despite its “obvious objections founded on international law.”29  
Influenced by Japan’s Enemy Airmen’s Act (from August 13, 1942), which 
allowed airmen to be sentenced to death for attacking civilians and non-
military targets, Germany established four criteria that constituted acts of terror 
for which airmen could be executed.30 These included: 
1) Attacking civilians, individuals as well as crowds; 2) Firing at German 
shot-down aircrews parachuting in the air; 3) Attacking passenger trains in the 
public service; 4) Attacking military hospitals, civilian hospitals, and hospital 
trains, which are clearly marked with the Red Cross.31  
This document was distributed by the High Command of the Armed Forces 
(Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) to the Commander of the Luftwaffe (Ober-
befehlshaber der Luftwaffe), the Reich Foreign Ministry, the chiefs of the secu-
rity police (Sipo), and the security service (SD). These four acts of terrorism 
were used as an attempt to justify Sonderbehandlung (special treatment), even 
after airmen had already been captured as POWs, for example at Dulag Luft in 
Oberursel. Additionally, these criteria were to be used as justification when 
cases of Lynchjustiz were published, although no evidence indicates that specif-
ic cases were publicly circulated. Yet analysis of Lynchjustiz against American 
airmen indicates that participation in these alleged acts of terror was not re-
quired to result in mistreatment; rather, this was often used as ex-post facto 
justification. The mere association with the enemy and terror flyers was often 
enough justification for perpetrators to lynch airmen [see Image 6].32 
                                                             
28  “Behandlung der feindlichen Terrorflieger”, from Deputy Leader of the Armed Forces 
Operations Staff (Stellv. Chef WFSt.) from June 6, 1944. NARA, Record Group 549, Case 12-
2000, Vol. 36. The original German text states: “Die Lynchjustiz würde als die Regel zu gelten 
haben.” 
29 Ambassador Ritter, “Draft of Letter from the Foreign Office to Chief OKW concerning 
treatment of enemy Terror Flyers,” To Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. 
Salzburg from June 20, 1944. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals under Control Council Law No.10, Volume XI (United States Government Printing 
Office: Washington, 1960), 175-77. 
30  For more information regarding Japan’s Enemy Airmen’s Act, see: Piccigallo 1979; Morrow 
2014; Guillemin 2017.  
31  “Behandlung der feindl. Terrorflieger,” Letter from Oberkommando der Wehrmacht 
(OKW/Armed Forces Operations Staff) to Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe (Commander in 
Chief Air Force) Concerning Treatment of Enemy “Terror” Flyers. June 14, 1944. Trials of War 
Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No.10, 
Volume XI. United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 1960, 170-71. See also 
NARA, Record Group 549, Case 12-2000, Vol. 36. 
32  For more information on the process of treating downed Allied airmen, see: Hall 2018. 
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Image 6: The Process of Treating Downed Airmen (Black Arrows Represent 
Mistreatment and Possible Death) 
 
A great example of this is the previously mentioned Rüsselsheim Massacre. 
After parachuting and landing near Osnabruck on August 26, 1944, eight 
American bomber crewmembers were captured and taken to Dulag Luft in 
Oberursel for interrogation (nearly two hundred miles away). However, before 
they reached Oberursel, two German military guards marched the flyers 
through the town of Rüsselsheim between 9:00 AM and 10:00 AM. However, 
citizens were “in an excited condition,” following the “longest and most de-
structive” bombing raid (carried out by the British) they experienced during the 
war and they quickly gathered around the airmen.33 Slurs and insults quickly 
led demands for reprisal by civilians, including women, who shouted, “Beat 
them to pieces!,” “Beat them to death!,” “They are the ones, they are the ones 
who were here last night! They are the terrorizers of last night! Kill the dogs!”34 
According to the prosecution’s report, the flyers were bleeding after being 
struck countless times by rocks, shovels, hammers, and other foreign objects. 
“Perpetrators badly beat one flyer such that by the time the group neared the 
end of the Taunusstrasse ... a piece of stone was sticking in his skull.”35 After 
                                                             
33  Review and Recommendations for Case No. 12-1497, Darmstadt by the Deputy Theater 
Judge Advocate’s Office – War Crimes Branch. August 23, 1945; Records of the Office of the 
Judge Advocate General (Army), RG 153, Entry 143, Box 361, National Archives at College 
Park, College Park, MD. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Ibid. 
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continuing down various streets in downtown Rüsselsheim in an attempt to 
avoid the deadly onslaught, the flyers struggled to seek refuge. Eventually, 
their walk reduced to a crawl, huddling together on the ground for protection. 
The propaganda chief of Rüsselsheim administered the final blows, for those 
that were still alive, with a shot to the head. After experiencing roughly two 
hours of constant torture and beatings, Hitler Youth members removed their 
bodies, some still showing signs of life, to the local cemetery where they were 
buried later that afternoon. Perpetrators gave no forethought as to what might 
happen if these bodies were identified as each airman still wore their uniforms 
and dog tags. While two men received fifteen-year imprisonments and the nine 
remaining perpetrators, including the two women, were sentenced to death, 
only five men were actually executed. The remaining criminals were paroled 
by January 1954, after serving roughly eight and a half years. 
No one questioned whether these American airmen should be treated hu-
manely as POWs, let alone whether they were even responsible for the bomb-
ing of Rüsselsheim. All that matter to these (largely civilian) perpetrators was 
revenge. Enraged by the devastation along with personal and physical loss–as 
well as constantly influenced by propaganda, which condoned and reinforced 
in citizens the justice of revenge–individuals quickly grasped when an oppor-
tunity presented itself. 
Regardless of accuracy, Goebbels sought to publicize lynchings for propa-
ganda purposes.36 He noted that local German police authorities were to report 
all attacks to the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) in Berlin, “giving details 
as to place, time and number of dead and wounded. This central agency would 
have to forward this report ... to the Foreign Affairs Office for exploitation.”37 
Furthermore, a June 24, 1944 secret bulletin from the senior SS and political 
Führer West Göhrum informed local political leaders that in cases involving 
retaliation by the population, if the downed airman took any action against 
them, for example defending themselves or attacking back, they were to “im-
mediately intervene with a firearm.”38 In addition, “if the leader of a state or 
local office (police chief, district council, mayor) or a commander or leader of 
the Order Police (Ordnungspolizei) decides that an immediate execution of a 
foreigner without a trial is needed, it is allowed ... in cases of immediate dan-
ger.”39  
                                                             
36  Unfortunately, the extent of the Germans’ claims of Allied strafing is unknown. 
37  Ritter, “Draft of Letter,” Trials of War Criminals, 175-7. 
38  Bulletin from Senior SS and Political Fuehrer West Göhrum. “Volksjustiz an plündernden 
Ausländern und abgesprungenen feindlichen Fliegern und Erschiessen dieser durch 
Ordnungspolizei,“ from June 24, 1944. NARA, Record Group 549, Case 12-2000, Vol. 36; The 
Original German text states: “Gehen abgesprungene feindliche Besatzungsmitglieder gegen 
die Bevölkerung vor, so ist sofort mit der Schusswaffe einzugreifen.“ 
39  Ibid. 
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A problem, however, that the Foreign Affairs Office had to solve was the re-
designation of POWs in order to “justify” their deaths. In accordance with 
international rules of law, “when an enemy airman has been captured by the 
armed forces or by the police and has been delivered to the air corps reception 
camp at Oberursel, he thereby has already acquired the legal status of a prison-
er of war.”40 Since the procedure for “special treatment” (Sonderbehandlung) 
by the SD nearly always meant certain death, officials maintained that 
an emergency solution would be to prevent suspected airmen from ever attain-
ing a legal prisoner of war status; that is, that immediately upon seizure they 
be told that they are regarded not as prisoners of war, but as criminals, and 
that they will be delivered not to ... a prisoner of war camp, but to the authori-
ties ... for the prosecution of criminal acts. ... If interrogations during those 
proceedings should reveal circumstances, which show that this special proce-
dure is not applicable to the particular case, then the airmen concerned might 
... be subsequently transferred to the legal status of prisoners of war by being 
sent to the reception camp at Oberursel. Naturally, even this expedient would 
not prevent Germany being accused of violating existing treaties, nor would it 
necessarily be a safeguard against reprisal measures ... against German prison-
ers of war. But at least this expedient would make it possible to follow a clear 
line, thus relieving us of the necessity of openly renouncing the present 
agreements, or, upon publication of each individual case, using excuses, 
which no one will believe.41 
Additionally, the Air Force High Command ultimately was responsible for 
downed Allied airmen. Upon capture, the nearest airfield headquarters 
(Fliegerhorstkommandantur) was responsible for security of the crash site and 
collection of the airmen and information, along with gathering any personal 
property. This information was vital, as it allowed the Luftwaffe to salvage the 
aircraft in an attempt to gain insight into Allied technology as well as compile a 
thorough database on downed flyers that interrogators used at Dulag Luft in 
Oberursel. However, as First Lieutenant Maulbehre of the Luftwaffe wrote in a 
diary entry from October 2, 1944, Reichsmarschall Goering agreed to the or-
ders by the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) that in cases where 
downed terror flyers were lynched by the population, the action of soldiers 
“may be issued by the air force as an order of the High Command of the Armed 
Forces but not as an order of the Air Force High Command.”42  
Although the Luftwaffe ultimately had jurisdiction over downed enemy fly-
ers, there were often internal disputes among the SS, Nazi Party, police, and 
                                                             
40  Ibid. 
41  Ritter, “Draft of Letter,” Trials of War Criminals, 175-7. 
42  War Diary by First Lieutenant Maulbehre, Operations Staff – Foreign Air Forces West, 
Concerning Conduct of Soldiers in Cases of Lynchings of Allied Airmen by the Population 
from October 2, 1944. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
under Control Council Law No.10, Volume XI. United States Government Printing Office: 
Washington, 1960, 178-79. 
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Wehrmacht. As the historiography has shown–corroborated by airmen’s mem-
oirs and testimonies – the Wehrmacht, in particular the Luftwaffe, offered the 
best chance of receiving appropriate treatment.43 There was a general camara-
derie between soldiers, meaning that airmen were usually afforded POW status 
and treated according to the laws of the Geneva Convention; however, mem-
bers of the SS, Party, and police repeatedly sought to mistreat and execute 
downed Allied airmen. The execution of flyers was often justified by the perpe-
trators as either “self-defense” or “shot while attempting to escape.” 
3.  The Scale of Lynchjustiz and Profile of Perpetrators 
The flyer trials were held throughout the United States zone of occupation, 
depending on location of the crime and availability of courts, as well as the 
assigned Army personnel, the accused, witnesses, and even audiences. 
Throughout the first year after the war, the majority of the trials were held in 
either Dachau or Ludwigsburg, as these were the two headquarters for the War 
Crime Investigation Teams (WCIT). By mid-1946, however, all war crime 
investigations and trials were taken over by the 7708 War Crimes Group, 
which relocated the remaining trials to Dachau. In order to get through the 
cases scheduled for trial as quickly as possible, the United States consolidated 
the 848 cases that involved all “lesser” war criminals into 460 trials – these 
became known as the “Dachau trials.” It was thus possible to have over seventy 
defendants combined in one trial. Ultimately, the United States’ goals of occu-
pation shifted from punishing Germans for war crimes to enabling a self-
sustaining economy and the growth of a democratic political system, which had 
a direct impact on the war crime trials. As a result, the 7708 War Crimes Group 
was officially disbanded in July of 1947. Open cases were handed over to West 
German officials in order to alleviate the insurmountable task of finding, inves-
tigating, and trying accused perpetrators of war crimes; however, the majority 
of perpetrators were released from prison by the mid-1950s. As historian Lisa 
Yavnai noted, “The release of convicted war criminals became a bargaining 
chip in the negotiations between the United States and West Germany over the 
latter’s integration into Western defense plans” (Yavnai 2007, 235). However, 
the release of war criminals not only hindered the German public from accept-
                                                             
43  Review and Recommendations for Case No. 12-2370; Deputy Theater Judge Advocate’s 
Office, War Crimes Branch, January 16, 1946; Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate 
General (Army), RG 153; Entry 143; Box 419, National Archives at College Park, College Park, 
MD; Review and Recommendations for Case No. 12-1994; Deputy Theater Judge Advocate’s 
Office, War Crimes Branch, January 16, 1946; Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate 
General (Army), RG 153; Entry 143; Box 403, National Archives at College Park, College Park, 
MD; “Citizens Menaced Hamburg Bombers,” The New York Times, October 22, 1943; 
“Germany Admits Fliers’ Lynchings,” The New York Times, June 1, 1944. 
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ing responsibility for the crimes of the Nazi regime but it also impeded the 
understanding and discourse of Lynchjustiz committed against American airmen.  
Despite their attempts to shed light on the “lesser” war criminals of World 
War II, the Dachau trials as a whole narrowly advanced the understanding of 
Nazi terror and Lynchjustiz committed against downed American airmen. A 
few key cases were published throughout the world, e.g. the Rüsselsheim Mas-
sacre, however, these failed to educate the German public, and even the world, 
about the extent of Nazi terror and the type of individuals involved in commit-
ting such atrocities. Even until now, historians have failed to place Lynchjustiz 
within the broader aspect of Nazi atrocities or the larger impact of these events 
on history. However, after the fall of 1946, the likelihood of uncovering addi-
tional crimes committed against American airmen became remote as the United 
States faced the looming Cold War (with the Soviet Blockade of West Berlin 
beginning in 1948 and the Korean War beginning in 1950); Germany also 
sought to quickly move on from its Nazi past. 
Analyzing 164 flyer trials held between 1945 to 1947 regarding airmen mis-
treated in Germany revealed that 464 perpetrators were charged with “deliber-
ately and wrongfully encourag[ing], aid[ing], abet[ting], and participat[ing] in 
committing assaults upon (or killing of) a ... surrendered prisoner of war.”44 
The victims included 320 American airmen: 73 percent were killed and 27 
percent survived the mistreatment.45 These trials represent roughly half of the 
total number of cases that investigated the mistreatment of downed American 
flyers. While a large number of these cases were never brought to trial, due to 
lack of evidence and witnesses, along with the inability to apprehend the al-
leged perpetrator, this initial analysis clearly indicates that far more Allied 
flyers were mistreated than scholars have previously alleged.  
Of the 320 American airmen analyzed in this study, over 50 percent of the 
flyers’ identities remain unknown. In numerous cases, airmen’s bodies were 
never recovered; yet, this did not deter some trials from convicting alleged 
perpetrators. The extent that perpetrators took to cover up these known crimes 
is clear. This made it often necessary for the prosecutors to rely on circumstan-
tial evidence in postwar trials and to include witness testimonies that relied on 
hearsay evidence. Additionally, local Germans were rather uncooperative in the 
criminal investigations after the war, and this hindered determining the identity 
                                                             
44  Deputy Theater Judge Advocate’s Office, War Crimes Branch, January 16, 1946, Records of 
the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Army), RG 153, Entry 143, Box 155-510, National 
Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
45  Nearly twenty-three percent of all airmen in the flyer trials were identified by their rank. 
Over fifty-three percent of the known American airmen were officers and over forty-six 
percent were enlisted men. Furthermore, at least sixty percent of all airmen were identified 
as bomber crewmembers. The majority of whom (over seventy percent) were killed through 
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Table 1: Information Pertaining to Tried Perpetrators 
Total number of perpetrators 464  
Average age of perpetrators (during trials) 45-years-old 
Known NSDAP members 50% 
Range of years when perpetrators joined the NSDAP  1922 - 1943 
NSDAP membership prior to 1933 61% 
NSDAP membership prior to 1939 91% 
Percentage of known “Alte Kämpfer” among perpetrators 30.5% 
 
It appears that the courts sought to punish swiftly perpetrators who were long-
standing members of the Nazi Party due to the large percentage of perpetrators 
tried in 1945 and 1946 that were members of the Nazi Party (50 percent). By 
1947, this percentage increased to nearly 74 percent, as the pressure increased 
to bring criminals to justice for crimes committed against American nationals, 
as well as to bring the trials to a close [see Charts 3 and 4]. Furthermore, 61 
percent of the accused had been members of the Nazi Party before 1933 [see 
Table 1], which clearly indicates the war crime trials pursued the so-called “old 
fighters” (Alte Kämpfer).47  
The Alte Kämpfer represented at least 30.5 percent of the accused in the 
postwar crime trials, which embodied a significantly large number of individu-
als proportional to the overall perpetrators tried (Kater 1983, 262).48 Historians 
have indicated that less than seven percent of the total German population 
belonged to the Party before 1939; thus, these perpetrators on trial represented 
a very small segment of the German populace. Although it appears that the Alte 
Kämpfer were actively involved in ordering and personally carrying out 
Lynchjustiz, countless perpetrators, especially civilians, were not brought to 
justice for their participation in the violence. After the war, the difficulty in 
finding perpetrators persisted, as many disappeared into hiding or individuals 
refused to reveal known instances of Lynchjustiz. 
During the trials, the ages of perpetrators ranged between nineteen and sev-
enty-two-years-old, with the average age being forty-five, which indicates an 
increased influence and role of the Nazi Party agenda [see Chart 5]. According-
ly, the perpetrators were often ardent supporters of the regime who had joined 
                                                             
47  Deputy Theater Judge Advocate’s Office, War Crimes Branch, January 16, 1946, Records of 
the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Army), RG 153, Entry 143, Box 155-510, National 
Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
48  According to 1933 and 1939 census records, the population went from around 65 million to 
roughly 69 million. In 1939, the Greater German Reich had a total population of roughly 79 
million. Accounting for this additional population results in Nazi Party membership 
comprising roughly 6.33 percent of the total population of the Greater German Reich. 
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the Nazi Party before Hitler had come to power. Women were also involved in 
Lynchjustiz committed against downed airmen; although, only seven women 
(less than 2 percent of all known perpetrators) were tried. However, there was a 
significant dark figure regarding the number of perpetrators (both men and 
women) who evaded capture. Flyers’ memoirs and Escape and Evasion reports 
often reported the viciousness of civilian crowds, which were reported to have 
numbered hundreds of individuals and often consisted of women.49 Although 
just being an Allied flyer was often more than enough justification for German 
reprisals, studies have shown that race, ethnicity, and religion also played a role 
in the treatment of POWs in general.50 While these three aspects were occa-
sionally mentioned in the flyer trials, it is likely that further research will reveal 
additional cases.  
Chart 5: Breakdown of Perpetrators by Age 
 
Austrian historian Georg Hoffmann characterized perpetrators as either instiga-
tors (Stimmungsmacher/innen), who promoted and condoned the lynching of 
airmen (Fliegerlynchjustiz), or followers (Mitläufer) who were often provoked 
by the “Bystander Effect” (Hoffmann 2015, 324).51 However, this is similar to 
the designated categories of the denazification process, which according to 
German historian Lutz Niethammer resulted in creating a Mitläuferfabrik, 
literally a “factory to produce followers” (Niethammer 1982).52 Using these 
categories results in blaming a small group of Nazi elites for Lynchjustiz and 
ignores not only other types of individuals involved, but also the various mo-
                                                             
49  According to trial data, over fifty-two percent of the known perpetrators represented the 
working class (with occupations such as farmers, butchers, bakers, carpenters, and 
mechanics) and over forty-four percent embodied the lower-middle class (which, for 
example, included administration official, police, merchants, teachers, and electricians). 
50  For example, see: Drooz 2004; Whitlock 2009; Wolk 2016 and Carlson 2005.  
51  See also: Barnett 1999. 
52  See also: Cohen 2006. 
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tives that influenced their involvement. Therefore, it is more appropriate to 
characterize the perpetrators into six main groups (civilians, police, security 
forces, Party officials, military personnel, and state officials) in an attempt to 
better represent the broader German society and ultimately understand the type 
of individuals that committed Lynchjustiz against flyers.53  
Chart 6: Groups Tried for Their Involvement in Lynchjustiz (by Percentage) 
 
Civilians represented the largest number of perpetrators tried with 39 percent 
[Chart 6].54 Closer examination indicates that they overwhelmingly represented 
the number of assaults committed against downed airmen with 70 percent [see 
Chart 7].55 The civilians acted primarily out of rage and distress in response to 
the destruction caused by the air war. This was an extremely emotional situa-
tion that Party officials used to their advantage by inciting the public – through 
propaganda – to seek revenge.56  
                                                             
53  Lisa Yavnai’s noteworthy dissertation and subsequent article about the Dachau trials 
categorizes perpetrators as civilians, Nazi officials, and military; however, the separation of 
military and paramilitary is very important given the increased radicalization of the 
paramilitary organizations. See: Yavnai 2007. 
54  Examples of civilian perpetrators include farmers, teachers, students, shoemakers, chemists, 
butchers, bakers, innkeepers, merchants, salesmen, musicians, carpenters, plumbers, 
machinists, mechanics, painters, attorneys, businessmen, and housewives. NARA, Record 
Group No. 242/388, Roll No. 10, Frame No.12 792. 
55  Deputy Theater Judge Advocate’s Office, War Crimes Branch, January 16, 1946. Records of 
the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Army). RG 153, Entry 143, Box 155-510. National 
Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
56  In this study, members of the Volkssturm are included in the category of civilians since 
members were largely young boys, old men, and even women. Moreover, the Volkssturm 
was considered a national militia, which served mostly as a last line of defense and often 
given the task (by Party officials, security forces, and police) of rounding up downed airmen. 
The Volkssturm often blurred the boundaries between paramilitary and civilians. Although, 
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Chart 7: Percentage of Perpetrators Involved in Lynchjustiz 
 
The police (e.g. Kripo, Orpo, Gendarmerie, as well as Rural and Auxiliary 
police forces) represented the second largest group of perpetrators tried with 
17.25 percent. These individuals often acted on orders from party officials and 
security force members – or at least often claimed this as their defense after the 
war. Members of security forces, which consisted of SS, SD, and Gestapo, 
represented 16.81 percent of perpetrators. The greatest disparity between in-
volvement in killings and assaults within a single group existed with the securi-
ty forces; this further verifies the known brutality of this group. Party officials 
(e.g. county and district Nazi Party leaders – Kreisleiter and Ortsgruppenleiter) 
represented 13.14 percent of perpetrators and were most likely to be indoctri-
nated and radicalized by the Nazi regime. Party officials and members of secu-
rity forces were prosecuted mainly for giving orders to mistreat and kill 
downed airmen, although their active participation in Lynchjustiz was not un-
common. Military personnel and state officials (e.g. non-Party government 
officials) represented the groups that were least likely to be prosecuted for 
committing Lynchjustiz against downed airmen with 11.63 percent and 2.15 
percent, respectively.  
Despite a sense of camaraderie between the Wehrmacht (in particular the 
Luftwaffe) and Allied airmen, soldiers still mistreated and killed downed fly-
                                                                                                                                
members were largely civilians before Hitler assembled the Volkssturm in October of 1944. 
Also, SA members have been characterized as civilians in this study. While they also burred 
the roles between a security force and civilians, they most often acted in the role of a 
civilian. Moreover, they were not considered a criminal organization under the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT). The members that represent Security Forces (SS, SD, and Gestapo) 
were, however, clearly defined by the IMT as criminal organizations. For more information, 
see: Hall 2018; Nolzen 2008; Seidler 1989. 
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ers. This was often out of revenge for lost family members or out of fear of 
retaliation for not following orders. Nazi Party members were represented in 
every group and were most likely to be found guilty of direct involvement in 
killing downed American aviators. Nevertheless, the significant role of civil-
ians involved in killings (27.94 percent) should not be underestimated.57  
Chart 8: Top Five Countries in Europe Where American Airmen Were Shot 
Down 
 
As previously mentioned, Lynchjustiz committed against Allied flyers did not 
just occur within the boundaries of Germany. Airmen were shot down through-
out Europe and this violence was not unique to American flyers, as airmen 
from every Allied nation experienced varying forms of mistreatment.58 Despite 
the overwhelming majority of aviators being shot down over Germany [see 
Chart 8], flyers were constantly brought from other nations to Germany (if they 
                                                             
57  For half of the civilians it remained unknown if they had been members of the Nazi Party. 
However, of the remaining civilians, 75 percent were confirmed to have been Party 
members, most of whom had joined before 1939. 
58  That being said, downed German flyers also experienced mistreatment in England during the 
Blitz; however, such instances were very rare and highlighted the difference between 
German and British societies. In particular, these differences emphasized the radicalization 
of war on German society. Moreover, the significance of the Nazi regime condoning and 
promoting Lynchjustiz against downed Allied airmen is clear when compared to the British 
government not tolerating such violence or following international laws of war. According 
to British historian Clive Emlsey, “At least two British officers … were found guilty by courts 
martial and dismissed for assaulting captured German aircrew shot down over the south of 
England in 1940 and 1941.” See also: Emsley 2013. For more information, see the following 
records at the British National Archives in London: WO 71/1048; WO 71/1061; See also: 
Niall 1998; Longden 2004; Schnatz 2002. 
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were not killed through Lynchjustiz) for interrogation at the Luftwaffe interro-
gation center (Dulag Luft) in Oberursel.59  
Chart 9: Groups Involved in Lynchjustiz 
 
Chart 10: Tons of Bombs Dropped by the United States in the European Theater 
in 1944 
 
The drastic increase in violence that immediately followed Goebbels’ public 
call for the German populace to defend the Volksgemeinschaft in May of 1944 
is clearly discernable when analyzing Lynchjustiz cases [Chart 9].60 Despite the 
                                                             
59  Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II – Final Report: December 7, 
1941 – December 31, 1946 Statistical and Accounting Branch Office of the Adjutant 
General, 1950. 
60  Joseph Goebbels 1944. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Civilian
Police
Security Forces
Party Officials
State Officials
Military
Personnel
0
10.000
20.000
30.000
40.000
50.000
60.000
70.000
80.000
90.000
Tons
Dropped
HSR 43 (2018) 2  │  304 
constant Allied bombardment of Germany [Chart 10], the flyer trials indicated 
that Lynchjustiz gradually decreased into the winter of 1944.  
The increase in violence against downed airmen in the summer of 1944 and 
Goebbels’ public approval of Lynchjustiz cannot be dismissed as mere coinci-
dence. Rather, propaganda combined with the escalating air war and Goebbels’ 
ability to persuade Hitler to engage German society in “total war” resulted in 
an increased number of downed airmen falling victim to Lynchjustiz. The mis-
treatment of flyers was most likely to result in death throughout the summer of 
1944; however, violence increased during the final months of the war, as the 
Nazi regime called for the continued defense of the Volksgemeinschaft. Alt-
hough the number of cases did not reach the levels of the previous summer, the 
brutality persisted. 
The last known case of Lynchjustiz against an American flyer in Germany 
was on April 16, 1945. Captain Chester F. Coggeshall from Hyannis, Massa-
chusetts [Image 7] crash-landed near Sillersdorf, Germany, roughly seven 
miles northwest of Salzburg, after strafing an airfield in the area.  
Image 7: Captain Chester F. Coggeshall (center) and His P-51 Mustang, the 
“Cape Cod Express” (Courtesy of Russ Abbey and Frank Birtciel)61 
 
According to the postwar crime trial held at Ludwigsburg on November 13 and 
14, 1945, around 2:30 in the afternoon flak damage caused Coggeshall’s air-
plane to lose altitude, forcing him to attempt a high-speed belly landing. The 
airplane’s right wing dug into the ground, resulting in the airplane cartwheeling 
through a small building on the edge of the field. Slightly wounded, Coggeshall 
exited the wreckage hoping to evade capture; however, members of the local 
                                                             
61  “55th Fighter Group Website.” Russ Abbey and Frank Birtciel. <http://www.station131.co.uk/ 
55th/Pilots/343rd%20Pilots/Coggeshall%20Chester%20E.%20Jr.%20Capt..htm> 
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Gendarmerie and German Army immediately captured and escorted him to 
Freilassing. There, the mayor, who was also district Nazi Party leader 
(Ortsgruppenleiter) of Freilassing and a Party member since 1931, denied 
Coggeshall first aid treatment. Acting on alleged orders from the county Nazi 
Party leader (Kreisleiter) of Berchtesgaden, the mayor, accompanied by Ger-
man soldiers, took Coggeshall in the evening hours into the woods near Frei-
lassing and shot him twice in the head. For his crime, the United States war 
crime tribunal sentenced the mayor to death, and he was executed on March 15, 
1946.62 
4.  Conclusion 
If the historiography is accurate that a similar number of British war crime trials 
investigated the mistreatment of a comparable number of downed British airmen, 
the occurrences of Lynchjustiz committed against downed British and American 
airmen in Germany conservatively exceeded 600 (Blank 2008, 466).63 However, 
the American and British war crime trials that investigated Lynchjustiz focused 
largely on the occupied areas of West Germany. Accounting for a large dark 
figure, which includes cases of Lynchjustiz that occurred in what became the 
German Democratic Republic, it is likely that there were at least 1,000 cases of 
Lynchjustiz against Allied airmen within Germany’s postwar borders. However, 
hundreds of cases remain overlooked, especially those in France, Belgium, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Poland. Preliminary research 
on violence against American airmen in the aforementioned nations concluded 
that Lynchjustiz occurred most often in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. 
This is reasonable given the increased number of airmen shot downed over these 
countries, the presence of German military and security forces, ardent collabora-
tors, as well as civilians affected by the radicalized air war (tens of thousands of 
pro-Allied civilians died in bombings during the war). Taking into consideration 
Lynchjustiz committed against all Allied airmen throughout Europe results in a 
conservative estimate of 3,000 cases of mistreatment.64 Considering this, along 
with accounting for airmen abused in POW and concentration camps and during 
death marches at the end of the war, it is likely that roughly one out of every ten 
Allied airman that survived being shot down was mistreated.65  
                                                             
62  Review and Recommendations for Case No. 12-1155. Deputy Theater Judge Advocate’s Office, 
War Crimes Branch, February 6, 1946. Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General 
(Army). RG 153, Entry 143, Box 345; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
63  See also: Stiepani 1999. 
64  For more information on the scale of Lynchjustiz committed against downed airmen, see 
Hall 2018.  
65  Over 35,000 American airmen were held as POWs in Germany. See: “Battle Casualties in Air 
Corps, by place, type and disposition,” Army Battle Casualties and Non-battle Deaths in 
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Analyzing the violence of Lynchjustiz can help understand better the nature of 
dictatorial terror as well as of evil itself (Johnson 2000, 464). Moreover, under-
standing the process of Lynchjustiz against downed airmen in Germany permits 
further clarification about the complex relationship between war and society. As 
exhibited in the hundreds of known cases of violence against American airmen 
during World War II, rationalization and ethics could be altered relatively quickly 
in an attempt to justify the radicalizing violence. Although the violence against 
airmen affected a minority of Allied flyers, it occurred far more often than previ-
ously acknowledged. Yet, the effects of the radicalized war did not perversely 
destroy people’s sense of morality, ethics, and the rule of law, as one might have 
thought given the scale of atrocities committed by Germany during the war. 
German citizens’ personal experiences in the war, the influence their experiences 
had on their attitude toward the Nazi regime, their previous familiarity with the 
United States and Britain, their religious and moral principles, as well as the 
phase of the war were all influential in the treatment of downed Allied airmen.  
The air war, compelled by the radicalization of Nazi atrocities, removed any 
form of security on the German home front. As a consequence, the Nazi regime 
sought to harness the outrage of the German population, redirecting their anger 
explicitly against downed Allied airmen. The regime took advantage of German 
citizens’ vulnerability in the overwhelming and lethal air war that erased nearly 
all physical and psychological boundaries. While a large portion of German 
society likely desired retribution against downed Allied airmen for their role in 
the devastating air war, a minority of Germans–largely Alte Kämpfer (early sup-
porters of the Nazi Party) and other ardent supporters of the regime, along with 
individuals who were deeply affected by the devastating air war, and citizens who 
were influenced by propaganda and those in positions of authority–actually re-
sorted to carrying out Lynchjustiz.  
While many perpetrators argued that they were ordered to partake in Lynchjus-
tiz and that any opposition could have resulted in death, it is important to remem-
ber that these criminals, especially Party officials and security forces, created 
these often false and self-serving characterizations in an attempt to escape prose-
cution after the war. However, an interpretation that points to a limited civilian 
involvement in Lynchjustiz is similarly misguided. Similar to how historians 
demonstrated (beginning in the 1990s) that German citizens willingly took part, 
albeit in varying degrees, in violence under the Nazi regime, Nazi terror (e.g. 
Lynchjustiz) similarly relied heavily on civilians to take part willfully and em-
phatically.66 The enormous culpability of lower-level officials, for example po-
                                                                                                                                
World War II – Final Report: December 7, 1941-December 31, 1946, Statistical and 
Accounting Branch Office of the Adjutant General, 1950, 78; For more information, see 
Makepeace 2017. 
66  For example, see: Browning 1992; Goldhagen 1997.  
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lice, Party officials, and security forces, in ordering and personally carrying out 
the violence against downed Allied airmen should not be obscured. 
Although Nazi Germany was a police state, it “allowed most of its citizens 
considerable room ... for the venting of everyday frustrations,” as social scientist 
and historian Eric A. Johnson has stressed (Johnson 2000, 485). Lynchjustiz is an 
excellent example of this. The regime allowed violence against downed flyers to 
ease the mounting pressure within the German population, as living under the 
bombs and among the ruins increased anxiety, fear, and anger, as well as ampli-
fied the Nazi regime’s pursuit of maintaining control over German society. Thus, 
Lynchjustiz was not only used as an additional line of defense in the drastic 
downfall of the Third Reich, but it also provided an ancillary attempt for citizens 
to seek revenge, soothe public anger, and put fear in the minds of Allied airmen. 
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